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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
LANA MARIE GUTIERREZ,

Case No. 930190-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, as
applicable to the States by the fourteenth amendment, provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Emphasis added.

Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein

guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Emphasis added.

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
The transcript submitted as an exhibit was created from
the original produced by the police after defense counsel listened
to

the

taped

interrogation

and

filled

in

sections

marked

"(inaudible)" and made corrections.1
The State stipulated that the transcript as modified and
submitted (R. 38-56) was accurate:
THE COURT: And both sides basically stipulate
that the transcript submitted to me is an accurate
transcript of what was said, both by law enforcement and
by the defendant; is that correct, Mr. Spikes?
MR. SPIKES:
That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
Mr. Loyd, is that correct?
MR. LOYD:
That is correct, Your Honor.
Particularly on these two points, there were no
corrections to the original transcripts, to the two
sections that were cited in my motion.
1

See R. 39 ("everything's cool" substituted for "inaudible"),
R. 40 ("it was" inserted in substitution of ellipses), R. 41 ("else
was" substituted for "(inaudible)"), R. 44 ("I think I took it"
substituted for "(inaudible)"), R. 45 ("for" substituted for
"through"), R. 49 ("Me and him" substituted for "we . . ";
"Boyfriend/girlfriend" substituted for "(inaudible)"; "Yes."
inserted; "was I headed now" inserted in substitution of ellipses),
R. 50 ("I was" substituted for "Up"; "Yes I did go into a bar"
substituted for "I guess (inaudible)"; "drinking" substituted for
"screaming"; "'Then be like that.'" substituted for "(inaudible)"),
R. 51 ("one of them, you know, that you cut things with."
substituted for "(inaudible)"; "mess[ed] up" substituted for
"nuts"; "Then I was drunk" substituted for "(inaudible)"; "Me and
him was" substituted for "We"), R. 52 ("he was hitting me, too.
That's why too." substituted for "(inaudible)"), R. 53 ("fell"
substituted for "bowed"), R. 54 ("when I left" inserted; "have"
inserted; "here" substituted for "him"), and R. 56 ("They had to
book me in and everything." inserted; "(Lana crying)" inserted).
2

R. 231:23-232:7. At no time did the State ask to play the tape for
the Court, and at no time did the Court indicate any reluctance to
listen to the tape of the interrogation.
Now, for the first time on appeal, the State asserts that
a copy of the tape recording of the interrogation should have been
played for the trial court, and testimony from the interrogating
officers

should

have

been

introduced

in

opposition

to Ms.

Gutierrez' motion to suppress.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In its brief, the State has requested that this matter be
remanded

to

afford

the

State

an

opportunity

to

create

a

supplemental record of evidence that the State chose not to
introduce before.
below.

The State should be limited to the record made

Case law cited by the State indicates only that appellate

courts should rule only after reviewing all the evidence presented
below, and after the trial court has considered the matter on the
merits.

The record here is complete and accurate, and the trial

court ruled directly on the issue of whether Ms. Gutierrez invoked
her right to remain silent.

This matter is ripe for decision.

There is no basis in law, equity, or on the facts which would allow
the State the relief they seek. The State is limited to the record
it created below.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I. MS. GUTIERREZ HAS ACTIVELY ASSERTED
HER CLAIM OF COERCION WITH RESPECT TO HER
INTERROGATION.
(Responding to n.2, p. 25 of Appellee's Brief)

The

State

asserts

that

Ms. Gutierrez

"affirmatively

waived any claim that her statement was the product of coercion."
Appellee's brief at p. 25, n.2.

The State misinterprets defense

counsel's statement. Counsel is correctly quoted as saying, "We're
not,

in our motion, suggesting

that there was other

activity going on in and around the interview
(emphasis added).

..."

coercive
R. 231

Appellant is not asserting that the officers

threatened to break her arms or kill her if she did not confess.
This is not to say, however, that no coercion occurred.
Ms. Gutierrez motion to suppress was filed because her
statements were coerced in violation of her fifth amendment rights.
This particular coercion, which was challenged and is preserved,
was unaccompanied by any other additional coercion.

The coercion

which did occur is just as harmful, improper, and illegal as any
other type of coercion which did not occur.
In Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S.
113 L.Ed.2d

, 111 S.Ct. 1246,

302, reh. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2067, 114 L.Ed.2d

472

(1991), the United States Supreme Court adopted the harmless error
doctrine in the context of coerced confessions.

The State argues

that Fulminante has no application to this case.

The harmless

error doctrine

Appellant

unaware

of

any

only has application
case

holding

that

4

on appeal.
contentions

concerning

is
the

standard of review on appeal must be raised in the trial court.
Appellant's claim that Fulminante should be rejected under the Utah
Constitution is properly before this Court.

POINT II. THE STATE FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS
BURDEN OF DEVELOPING AN ADEQUATE RECORD
IN THE TRIAL COURT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULING. THE STATE HAS CONFESSED
ERROR, AND MS. GUTIERREZ IS ENTITLED TO A
NEW TRIAL.
(Responding to Point II of Appellee's Brief)

A.

THE STATE HAS NOW CONFESSED ERROR.

The State admits:
Even though it prevailed before the trial
court, the State does not believe it can ask this Court
to affirm the trial court's ruling based on the
inadequate record that was developed below.
Appellee's brief at 26.

Since the State had the burden in the

trial court, and has conceded in this Court that it did not sustain
that burden, the inquiry is ended. The State has confessed error,
and Ms. Gutierrez is entitled to a new trial.2

2

Even if this Court determines that the State has "stoptped]
short of conceding" Ms. Gutierrez' arguments, see State v. Sampson,
808 P.2d 1100, 1112 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d
507 (1992), "the state should have raised the argument in its
initial briefing on appeal if it believed this fall-back position
had merit." Id. Sampson was cited throughout Appellant's Brief.
The State is fully aware of its obligation to brief its legal
arguments on appeal, and one must assume the State read Sampson as
a result of appellant's reliance on it. The State's failure to
argue any legal issues concerning the right to remain silent can
only be construed as a concession of the accuracy of appellant's
position. The State has placed all its eggs in one basket by
seeking a remand without arguing the merits at all. Under these
circumstances, this Court is fully justified in finding that the
State has conceded error.
5

B.

THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND OF
MAKING AN ADEQUATE RECORD WAS ON THE
STATE, AND ITS FAILURE MANDATES
REVERSAL.

The State has "a heavy burden to establish both that a
defendant

understood

h[er]

voluntarily waived them."

Miranda

rights

and

that

[s]he

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1108

(Utah App. 1990) (citing State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah
1986)), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied.
U.S.

, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992).

See also State v.

Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987) ("The right to remain
silent and the right to counsel during a custodial interrogation
may be waived, but these waivers must be both intentional and made
with full knowledge of the consequences, and the defendant is given
the

benefit

of

every

reasonable

presumption

against

such a

waiver."), cert, denied. 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S.Ct. 777, 98 L.Ed.2d
864 (1988) . Because the burden was squarely on the State, and the
State now concedes that the record they made is inadequate, Ms.
Gutierrez is entitled to an order of reversal, and an order that
her statements be suppressed at any retrial.

POINT III.
REMAND IS NOT APPROPRIATE OR
NECESSARY.
(Responding to Point II of Appellee's brief)

A.

ABSENT A SHOWING THAT THE STATE WAS
WRONGFULLY PRECLUDED FROM MAKING AN
ADEQUATE RECORD, REVIEW IS LIMITED
TO THE ACTUAL RECORD MADE.

Appellate courts cannot rule on matters outside the trial
court record.

State v. Sparks. 672 P.2d 92, 94
6

(Utah 1983),

overruled on other grounds bv State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 631
n.8 (Utah 1987) . The record does not reveal that the State ever
attempted to introduce a recording of the interrogation into
evidence.3

The State may not seek to introduce a recording of the

interrogation now, on appeal, where they failed to do so below.
"Generally, a [litigant] who fails to bring an issue
before the trial court is barred from asserting it initially on
appeal."

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991);

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) ("'some form of
specific

preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the

trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim
on appeal'", quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987)).
The State here is not claiming error on the part of the
trial court.4

Rather, the State is claiming that it made a

tactical error when it freely and voluntarily decided what evidence
to present at the suppression hearing.

The State is bound by its

decision not to introduce the recording of the interrogation, and
it may not be offered and introduced on appeal or on remand.5
3

To the contrary, the record shows that the state stipulated
to the accuracy and use of the written transcript, thereby
affirmatively waiving the opportunity to introduce the recording
into evidence at the suppression hearing.
4

E.g., by excluding the recording, or ruling summarily without
allowing the State to make a record.
5

Appellant's vigorous opposition to the State's requested
remand to introduce the tape recording of the interrogation should
not be misconstrued as an indication that there is anything
contained therein that would help the State. Chuck Loyd, trial
counsel for Ms. Gutierrez, painstakingly reviewed the recording
when he corrected the State's sloppy transcription.
He has
indicated to appellate counsel that the recording is unremarkable.
7

The State has made no showing that the tape recording
differs in any way from the transcript to which it stipulated in
the trial court.

Counsel for the State has not included an

affidavit setting forth with particularity what it believes the
recording will show.
Procedure

Compare Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate

(counsel is required to include "affidavits alleging

facts not fully appearing in the record" when a defendant asserts
ineffective assistance of counsel and moves for remand).

The

State's request for remand has no factual foundation and is based
entirely on speculation that the tape might help the State's
argument.

Requiring appellant to continue to defend this case on

remand is a waste of valuable time and resources, and is without
merit.

B.

CASE LAW CITED BY THE STATE IS
INAPPOSITE AND DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
STATE'S REQUEST FOR A REMAND.

The State correctly notes that "[o] ther courts that have
faced the task of determining whether similar statements served to
invoke a defendant's rights under Miranda have relied on tapes of
the interrogation and testimonial evidence to put the defendant's
statements in their proper context." Appellee's Brief at 27-8. In
all those cases, however, the tapes and testimonial evidence were
properly presented in the trial court.

The State does not cite a

single case where an appellate court has allowed the State to

Perhaps the prosecutor stipulated to the accuracy of the transcript
because it in fact is accurate, and declined to introduce the
recording because it adds absolutely nothing.
8

present additional evidence in a case on appeal to support the
trial court's determination.
In People v. Porter, 221 Cal.App.3d 1213, 270 Cal.Rptr.
773 (1990) :
At trial, defendant objected in limine on
Miranda grounds to the introduction of a taped confession
he had given to police officers.
After holding an
evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury, the
trial court ruled defendant's confession admissible. A
redacted version of the tape was then played for the
jury.
Id. at 1216, 270 Cal.Rptr. at 775 (emphasis added).

The State's

discussion of Porter, Appellee's brief at 31-4, correctly notes
that consideration of the tape of the confession aided the court,
but the court was only reviewing the evidence properly offered and
received by the trial court. In this case, that evidence consists
solely of the stipulated transcript. This court should review that
transcript;

nothing more, nothing less.

People v. Jennings, 760 P.2d 475

(Cal. 1988), cert.

denied, 489 U.S. 1091, 109 S.Ct. 1559, 103 L.Ed.2d 862 (1989) is
similar:
After an independent review of the videotaped
interrogation of defendant we conclude that the trial
judge, who also reviewed the tape . . .
Id. at 479

(emphasis added) .

No new evidence was allowed or

addressed on appeal.
The State's discussion of State v. Chapman, 605 A. 2d 1055
(N.H. 1992) indicates that this case also deals only with an
appellate court reviewing the evidence presented in the trial
court.

"'At the hearing of defendant's motion to suppress, the

trial court heard three days of testimony and viewed the videotape
9

. . .'"

Appellee's brief at 30 quoting Chapman at 1060 (emphasis

added) . Chapman does not stand for the proposition that the State
may attempt to supplement the record with evidence that was never
offered below.
Similarly, the trial court in People v. Silva, 754 P.2d
1070 (Cal. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 820, 102
L.Ed.2d 809

(1989), listened to the taped interrogation.

See

Appellee's Brief at 36 ("'Here, the trial court listened to the
tape recording . . .'"; quoting Silva at 1083-4) . Silva does not
advance the State's position.
The State's contention that testimony from the officers6
and Ms. Gutierrez7 might be illuminating does not provide a basis
for remand.

First, the only relevant intent is the intent of Ms.

Gutierrez.

The burden is on the state to show a knowing and

voluntary waiver of defendant's Miranda rights. The intent of the
officers is irrelevant.8

There is no good faith exception for

6

See Appellee's Brief at 38 ("the testimony of [Officers]
Potter or Romero might reveal whether the officers were uncertain
about whether defendant was expressing a desire to remain silent
but pressed forward anyway. Their testimony might also reveal that
they did not fully appreciate the legal significance of defendant's
statements."); Appellee's Brief at 27 ("the officers may be able to
explain how they were situated at critical times during the
interrogation and how they interpreted defendant's statements.").
7

See Appellee's Brief at 39 ("Similarly, it may be that
defendant herself will acknowledge that her statements were not
intended to be an invocation of her right to remain silent.").
8

The State quotes Hatcher v. State, 379 S.E.2d 775, 778 n.3
(Ga. 1989) for language indicating the officers in that case
believed "'only the suspect's invocation of his right
to
counsel
required halting the interrogation.'" Appellee's Brief at 38-9.
Despite the State's claim that on remand officers Potter and Romero
might reveal information indicating their ignorance of their
constitutional obligations to Ms. Gutierrez, such a revelation
would not help the State's position. Obviously, police officers
10

coerced confessions.

Finally , Ms. Gutierrez has the absolute

right to remain silent at any evidentiary hearing in this matter.
The State's suggestion that Ms. Gutierrez might help its case on
remand is speculation as to an event that is unlikely to occur in
the face of her right to remain silent.9

POINT IV. STRAIN AND WILLETT DO NOT ADVANCE
THE STATE'S POSITION THAT REMAND IS
APPROPRIATE.
(Responding to Point II, subsection
Appellee's Brief)

2 of

Utah case law cited by the State supports the following
propositions:

1)

appellate courts should have a complete record

before ruling; and 2) appellate courts should decline to address
matters for the first time on appeal. The only Utah case law cited
by the State is State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989) and
Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d

860

(Utah 1992).

Neither case

authorizes the relief the State now seeks. The record in this case

are charged with knowledge of the law. Their understanding or
belief doesn't impact the inquiry into whether Ms. Gutierrez waived
her rights.
This gross speculation by the State is simply
irrelevant to the necessary inquiry here.
9

Counsel is hesitant to disclose matters concerning attorneyclient discussions, but would indicate to the court that he has
come across nothing in the record or in conversations with Ms.
Gutierrez that would indicate any factual basis for the State's
rampant speculation that Ms. Gutierrez, if she could be forced to
testify, might indicate that she did not seek to terminate the
interrogation.
11

is complete,10 and the trial court ruled on all determinative
issues.
Willett involved a pre-Gibbons11 plea, which had to be
assessed under the "substantial compliance" test.

The Supreme

Court could not affirm on the basis of the incomplete record before
it-.
However, we do not know that the plea was
defective.
We do not have a complete copy of the
preliminary hearing transcript before us, and for that
reason, we cannot determine whether what occurred at the
preliminary hearing was sufficient to provide a factual
basis for plaintiff's later plea. We therefore remand
the matter to the trial court to permit the State an
opportunity to produce a proper transcript of the
preliminary hearing or to otherwise prove what occurred
there.
Willett, 842 P.2d at 863. This remand was very limited in scope,
and no new or additional evidence was to be adduced.
In this case, we know exactly what transpired below. The
record is accurate, complete, and determinative of all issues
raised on appeal.
recording

The State did not even attempt to introduce a

of the interrogation; rather

interrogation transcript.

it stipulated

to the

The State is bound by its decision

below, and limited to the record it made.
Strain involved a motion to suppress a confession on the
grounds of an inadequate Miranda warning and coercive statements by
the police indicating that absent a confession defendant would face

10

The fact that the State could have presented additional
evidence below does not affect the completeness of the record: the
record here accurately and completely reflects all that transpired
in the trial court, and fully allows this court to review those
proceedings.
11

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987).
12

the death penalty.

The trial court originally granted the motion

to suppress due to lack of Miranda warnings.

Later discovered

evidence indicated that Strain was in fact properly Mirandized,

and

the trial court reversed its order of suppression. The trial court
never specifically addressed Strain's objection concerning the
coercive statements.
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded:
In the instant case, the trial court did not
address the defendant's contention that even though an
adequate Miranda warning had been given to him, his
subsequent confession was the result of coercive threats
and promises made by the interrogating officers. We
therefore do not have before us an adequate record upon
which we can determine the question of voluntariness.
Strain, 779 P. 2d at 227.

Justice Zimmerman's concurrence is

instructive:
As the majority notes, the detective's comments were
plainly outside the bounds of permissible interrogation
and were, on their face, coercive.
Moreover, the
transcripts demonstrate that defendant's confession was
made immediately after these coercive statements. For
the benefit of the trial court and the parties, I think
we should indicate that while the State has contended
that "it may be possible
. . . to find . . . that Bell's
improper statements did not actually induce defendant to
confess" (emphasis added), if such a finding were based
on nothing more than the evidence presented to us at this
point, there would be some doubt as to such finding's
sustainability.
Id. at 227-8.

In this case, the trial court ruled directly on the

issues presented by defendant's motion to suppress.

The State

offered all the evidence it cared to, and the trial court ruled in
the State's favor.
of

the

record

This court should rule now on the sufficiency

the

State

created

below,

without

a

legally

unwarranted and factually unnecessary remand that will elicit
nothing helpful to this Court's determination.
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CONCLUSION
The State is engaging in pure speculation, and seeks a
second bite at the apple.

Appellate courts review what occurred

below without reinventing the wheel. Any evidence the State felt
was necessary and appropriate should have been presented below.
The State has waived its right to have the trial court, or any
other court, review the interrogation recording.
This matter is ripe for decision.
admits,

the

record

below

cannot

support

As the State freely
the

trial

court's

determination that Ms. Gutierrez waived her right to remain silent.
This case should be reversed, with directions to suppress Ms.
Gutierrez' statements and grant her a new trial.
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